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This paper is part of a larger project which aims to trace continuities and changes in
governmental and punitive techniques of the Ottoman power over moral order from
the mid-eighteenth century to the early decades of the Tanzimat era. The larger project
aims to analyze the legal culture of the Tanzimat through both norms (imperial
decrees, criminal codes, etc.) and practices (litigations in the courts and higher
councils). As a beginning to this larger project, the current paper makes only a
discursive analysis of the Tanzimat Edict and the Criminal Codes of the period.
 
Introduction
1 There is no doubt that human dignity occupies a fundamental place in international
human rights as well as in constitutional democracies of the world. The Preamble of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the 1948 starts as, “all men are born
free  and  equal,  in  dignity  and  in  rights.”  The  very  first  article  of  the  German
constitution declares human dignity as inviolable and entrusts all the state authorities
with protecting it.1 Most of the constitutional courts protect basic rights such as right
to life, property, privacy, freedom of speech and reproduction in various ways through
rationalizing  this  normative  concept  of  human  dignity  despite  the  fact  that
interpretations vary.2
2 Although the modern Turkish Constitution of 1982 which is the current constitution in
the Turkish Republic  does not use the term human dignity,  this  normative term is
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replaced by another one: “honor” (i.e., onur).3 The preamble of the Turkish Constitution
clearly states:
“Every Turkish citizen has an innate right and power to lead an honorable life and
to improve his/her material and spiritual well-being under the aegis of national
culture, civilization, and the rule of law through the exercise of fundamental rights
and freedoms set forth in this constitution in conformity with the requirements of
equality and social justice.”4
Living  an  honorable5 life  and  improving  material  and  spiritual  well-being  through
exercising  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  is  what  human  dignity  means  in  the
Turkish constitution.  Why are  dignity  and honor always  pronounced together  with
justice in constitutional agreements between the state and its citizens?
3 The association of honor with justice was in fact codified well over a hundred years
earlier by the Tanzimat Edict of 1839 in the Ottoman Empire. This proto-constitution
guaranteed protection of “life, honor and property” to the Ottoman subjects. Yet, such
a proto-constitutional relationship between the subjects and the state actually started
much earlier, at least in legal correspondence between the Ottoman subjects and the
central  government  in  the  eighteenth  century.  This  paper  aims  to  historicize  the
notion of honor in Ottoman legal discourse and practice from the early-modern period
to the so-called “reform era,” the era most scholars maintain began with the Tanzimat
Edict of 1839. Such a historical approach uses justice as a key to understand honor not
as  a  value  system  but  as  a  rhetoric.  By  doing  this,  it  also challenges  the
conceptualization of honor as a value system or a structure upon which a monolithic
Mediterranean culture  has  been  constructed.  Thus,  it  problematizes  an  a-historical
conception of honor which takes for granted that honor codes in modern societies are
largely the legacy of “traditional” norms of pre-modern periods.
4 This  study  argues  that  the  recurring  presence  of  honor  in  the  correspondence
especially between the central government and the Ottoman subjects in the eighteenth
century reflects the development of new parameters between the state and its subjects
in moral terms. Although the idea of the “circle of justice” (daire-yi  adliyye)  already
conceptualized a reciprocal relationship between the government and subjects on the
basis of legitimacy and justice, a persistent emphasis on honor—with regard to sexual
violence  but  not  necessarily  restricted  to  it—in  the  legal  terminology  of  both  the
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries points to a new moral discourse that emerges
during this period. The Ottoman central government’s claim to protect the honor of its
subjects in the eighteenth century reflects a dialogic process in which subjects started
to use new types of legal terminology and concepts to elicit the intervention of state in
local matters that threatened their well-being. On the one hand, the motto of “life,
honor and property” featured in the Tanzimat Edict represents a continuation of the
discourse  of  honor  as  a  legitimizing  mechanism.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  legal
codification of honor in the Criminal Codes of the nineteenth century reflects a novel
constitutional  construction  of  gendered  citizenship  around  reproduction  in  the
conjugal family through the partnership of the patriarchal state and male subjects.
5 To discuss the historical development of this relatively novel relationship, the paper
first explores the theories of the “circle of justice” in conjunction with the politico-
administrative jurisdiction of the sovereign in Islamic and Ottoman political thought
and practice. Secondly, it traces the utilization of the term “violation of honor” (hetk-i
‘ırz)  in  eighteenth-century  Ottoman  legal  practice  and  discourse  and  explores  the
pivotal  role  of  sexuality  in  the  perception  of  honor  and  violence.  Furthermore,  it
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analyzes the discourse of the “protection of honor” as a legitimizing motive behind the
interventions of the political power in the sexual sphere. Finally, it contemplates the
motto of “life, honor and property” of the Tanzimat Edict as well as the codification of
the concept of “violation of honor” in the Criminal Law of the nineteenth century to
investigate the continuities with as well as ruptures from earlier notions of honor. One
should note  here  that  the  analysis  of  the  Tanzimat legal  reforms of  the  nineteenth
century are confined only to the discursive analysis of texts, whereas, the eighteenth-
century legal culture has been analyzed through both legal discourse and practices.
This paper aims to show that the novelty of the discourse of honor in the nineteenth
century was its disposition towards the family as the locus of “protecting life” through
reproduction.
 
“Circle of Justice” in Early-Modern Ottoman Legal
Theory
6 The political prerogative of the Ottoman state over the “social” space of its subjects and
the close moral association of justice and honor have their roots in the pre-Ottoman
past.  In  the  patrimonial  structure  of  the  Ottoman political  system,  the  idea  of  the
“circle  of  justice”6 conceptualized  justice  as  being  directly  disseminated  by  the
sovereign as the trustee of the prosperity of its subjects. Furthermore, the principle of
siyasa shar‘iyya in Islamic law, especially in the Hanafi doctrine of law that the Ottomans
officially adopted, provided grounds for the political prerogative of the sovereign, and
the government on his behalf, to preside over public order.
7 The close relationship between the idea of the wise and moral ruler and the well-being
and honor of his subjects upon which the Ottoman idea of justice was constructed has
its  roots  in  a  universal  perennial  repertoire.  Inspired  by Greek  political  wisdom
literature and themes from the writings of apparently Sasanian origin, Arabic political
writing in the Umayyad and Abbasid periods was established upon some aggregative
common topics of power among which are the axial position of power (sultan) in the
organization of social order and “the direct impact of his virtues and vices upon the
moral  tenor  of  his  subjects”  (Al-Azmeh  2001:  83-95).  The  “mirror  for princes”  or
“advice for kings” genres written by the courtiers such as Nizam al-Mülk (1018-1092)
and  by  prominent  ulama  luminaries  like  al-Ghazali  (1058-1111)  and  al-Mawardi
(972-1058) used a political  repertoire of  hierarchy emphasizing the primacy of king
over society denoting self-mastery as prerequisite for the proper exercise of power and
ethical preconditions of just rulership deriving from Aristotelian ethics and material of
Greek origin (ibid.: 94-8).
8 Yet, what the works of advice for kings written by the Arabic ulama did was rename and
recast  “the  perennial  political  wisdom attributed  to  Persians,  Greeks  or  others”  as
“prophetic  or  Koranic”  and  insert  “in  a  distinctive  genealogy  that  is  specifically
Muslim” (ibid.:  99).  This is  how, according to Aziz ʻAẓmah, the Muslim character of
public institutions was brought about. The development of the genre of shar’ist politics
(siyasa  shar‘iyya)  which  set  the  discursive  rules  of  the  legal  arrangements  of
government was also based on the amalgamation of the paradigm of political writings
with  absolutist  claims  and  of  Muslim  jurisprudence  with  prescriptive  exemplary
models (ibid.: 100). Hence, the idea that the ruler represents an exemplary moral model
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for his subjects and therefore determines the moral order of the society he rules is a
very ancient one upon which early Ottoman political thought was established.
9 First,  the Ottomans appropriated and transformed many of  these ideas  into a  local
model according to changing political and social needs throughout the long history of
the Empire. In early Ottoman political writings such as the Ahmedî’s (c 1334/1335-1412)
Iskendernâme and Tursun Beğ’s (after 1426-after 1488) Târîh-i Ebü’l-Feth (History of the
Conqueror), the ethical discourse on the kingly virtues emphasized in earlier literature
was adopted, for example, in explaining the close connection between the ruler’s moral
virtues like his honor or honesty (‘iffet) and justice (‘adâlet) (Sariyannis 2011: 122-26). In
Kanûn-i  Şehinşâhî (Imperial Laws),  Bitlisî  (ca.  1450-1520) defines four cardinal virtues
(honesty/chastity,  courage, wisdom and justice) among which justice represents the
combination  of  the  other  three.  Furthermore,  affection  and  fairness  towards  his
subjects [“the same way he expects his subjects to fulfill their own obligations”] are
intrinsic to his definition of justice.7 One should note that the relationship between the
king and his subjects is defined here in a mutual terms.
10 These exemplary models turned into a more abstract model of governance with the
idea of the “circle of justice” from the late sixteenth century onwards, especially in the
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.  The idea was conceptualized in Ottoman
political writings such as Kınalızade Ali Çelebi’s (d. 1572) Ahlak-i ‘Ala’i (1565), Hasan Kâfî
Akhisarî’s Usulü’l-Hikem fi Nizamı’l-Alem (1596), Koçi Bey’s Risale (1631) and Katib Çelebi’s
Düsturü’l-‘amel (1652-53).8 Kınalızade’s version which repeats an aphorism attributed to
Aristotle’s letter of advice to Alexander the Great is the following:
“Justice leads to the rightness of the world; the world is a garden, its walls are the
state; the state is ordered by the shari‘a; the shari‘a is not guarded except by the
king; the king cannot rule except through an army; the army is summoned only by
wealth; wealth is accumulated by the subjects; the subjects are made servants of the
ruler by justice.”9
11 To put it in more concrete terms, rather than highlighting the specific virtues of the
ruler, the “circle of justice” most often defined a model of good administration and
governance, albeit mostly in relation to the ruler, but through more abstract notions of
state, justice and the prosperity of the subjects. This does not mean that the idea of
“circle  of  justice”  was  a  contribution  of  the  Ottomans  to  Islamic  politics.  On  the
contrary, the idea of the circle was also a very ancient Mediterranean and Near Eastern
philosophical tradition which had an impact on political thinking. The Near Eastern
conception of the state puts the ruler, with divine appointment, at the center of the
polity in which he had a reciprocal relationship with his subjects through production,
taxation and justice, above all  the other classes in the society (Darling 2008).  There
were of  course variations in the Ottoman model,  too:  While Kınalızade situated the
sultan apart from different classes in society, Hasan Kafi counted him as one of the
members  of  the  military  class  (Hagen  2005:  63-4).  Yet,  there  was  almost  no
disagreement among Ottoman political thinkers that Ottoman society was organized in
social classes (i.e. the men of the sword, the men of the pen, the men of agriculture and
the men of commerce and trade), and, that the sultan was responsible of creating a
balance among them by keeping “everybody in due place.”10
12 What made the “circle of justice” apparently more appealing to the Ottomans in later
centuries  was  the  circle’s  intrinsic  emphasis  on  institutionalized  governmental
structures  more  than  the  personal  virtues  of  the  sultan.  To  establish  a  reciprocal
system of governance and organize the social relationships between different classes
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and groups in an anticipated balance, the circle implies that there must be specialized
institutions such as the finances to manage the agricultural infrastructure provided by
the state, laws and revenue surveys, and the courts of petitions. Thus, the idea of circle
served the interests of the Ottomans who were in a process of state formation and
bureaucratization through different institutions after the sixteenth century.
13 The Ottomans used this aggregative repertoire in their praxis of politico-administrative
jurisdiction.  The  necessity  of  maintaining  public  order  through  administrative  and
penal regulations gave rise to Ottoman legal institutions, as had also happened in other
Muslim societies before the Ottomans.  Parallel  to the shari‘a courts which were the
principle  legal  institutions  throughout  the  Empire,  the  Imperial  Council  (Divan-ı
Hümayun)  as  a  legislative  and  executive  court  administered  public  order  through
imperial  statutes  and decrees.  It  was  in  fact  established upon the medieval  Islamic
notion of mazalim jurisdiction. Mazalim,  literally “injustice and wrongful deeds,” was
again directly related to the idea that,  a Muslim sovereign, as the trustee of public
order, was responsible for removing injustices. Mazalim courts which allowed subjects
to petition directly the caliph in the case of injustices perpetrated by official and semi-
official powers were established in medieval Islamic Arab and Iranian states before the
emergence  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.11 One  can  again  notice  that  the  Near  Eastern
conception of the ruler as the one who protects subjects from the power elite resonates
in this understanding of mazalim jurisdiction.
14 The Imperial Council was in fact the embodiment of the idea of “circle of justice” in
which the moral virtues associated with the ruler were institutionalized. It functioned
as a parallel but superior judiciary organ that heard petitions, judged some important
cases  of  petitioners  in  its  own  court  (divan)  or  sent  imperial  orders  to  provincial
governors and judges in order to resolve issues there. The judicial and administrative
roles of the sultan in the Divan started to diminish first by Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481) and
were  gradually  transferred  to  the  grand-vizier  and  his  government  through  the
physical  as  well  as  functional  move  of  the  Divan-ı  Hümayun  to  the  “Council  of  the
Pasha’s  Gate”  (Paşakapısı  Divanı)  beginning  from the  sixteenth  century  towards  the
eighteenth  century.12 However,  it  still  symbolized  the  abstract  notion  of  “good
governance” and “justice” that is perceived as the responsibility of the sultan towards
his subjects in the circular, reciprocal relationship between the state and the subjects.13
Put  another  way,  injustices  in  society  ought  to  be  prevented by this  governmental
institution that embodied the sultan who was responsible of restoring social balance.
15 The association of  justice  and the  legitimacy of  the  government  symbolized  in  the
Imperial Council took more pragmatic political shape in Ottoman reform literature by
the late seventeenth century. On the one hand, informing this shift from the “personal”
moral virtues of the ruler towards the “political” appeared as critiques of particular
policies of the government might be considered “the dissolution of the moral discourse
over  legitimacy”  (Hagen  2005:  80)  or  “gradual  abandonment  of  ethical  approach”
(Sariyannis 2011: 136). On the other hand, defining legitimacy through justice and the
other way around can also be read as part of the process of the bureaucratization and
institutionalization  which  enabled  authors  to  envisage  a  reform  agenda  through
practical  administrative measures.  For example,  some authors compiled private law
books (kanunname) based on both old (kadim) and contemporary statutes from imperial
registers to be implemented. Risale-i  Kavanîn-i  âl-i  Osman der hulasa-i  mezamin defter-i
divan by Ayn’ Ali Efendi, secretary of the Register of Imperial Revenues (Defter-i Hakani
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Emini)  in  1610  (1018)14 and  Telhisü’l-beyan  fî  kavanîn-i  âl-i  Osman by  the  historian
Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi in 1675-76 (1086)15 can be counted within this genre.16
16 Yet,  such  a  move  from  the  persona  of  the  sultan  to  a  more  abstract  and
institutionalized notion of governance and politics does not necessarily eliminate the
conception of justice and legitimacy through a moral glance. As Ferguson reminds us in
analyzing Ottoman treatises, legitimacy always “rests on moral principles” (Ferguson
2010: 106). It is true that the circular understanding that legitimacy derives from the
justice  of  the  government  towards  the  subjects  (re‘aya)  was  no  longer  the  primary
criterion  of  good  governance  for  Ottoman  treatise  writers  in  the  seventeenth  and
eighteenth centuries. Ottoman treatise writers came from the same elite circles who
were threatened by the re‘aya’s intrusion into their class privileges and understood this
as  something  that  undermined  the  social  balance  that  the  sultan  was  supposed  to
preserve (Hagen 2005: 80; Ferguson 2010: 106-7). Yet, on the other hand, the political
theory espoused by the Ottoman elite does not necessarily reflect the perspective of
re‘aya on justice and legitimacy of the government. As Hagen rightfully notes about
legitimizing discourse in advice literature, the taxpaying subjects who are “allegedly
active participants in the discourse on legitimacy, are conceived in this discourse as
mute objects of justice or injustice” acting as “God’s tools in punishing the unjust ruler”
(Hagen 2005: 82). He also warns researchers to acknowledge the essential difference
between  “construing  the  subjects  as  God’s  tools  or  as  social  agents  disputing
legitimacy” to be able to see the nuances between historical ideas and the “‘objective’
mechanisms” (ibid.: 83).
17 What  I  want  to  do  in  the  rest  of  this  paper  is  primarily  to  take  into  account  the
mechanisms in which the Ottoman subjects have found legal means to act as agents
disputing legitimacy. I look at the interaction between the government and its subjects
through  petitioning  the  Imperial  Council  and  analyze  the  legal  discourse  mutually
deployed in this  interaction in order to demonstrate a  continuation of  a  reciprocal
relationship between the state and the subjects through legitimacy and justice. I also
argue that the notion of  honor played a central  role in claims over legitimacy and
justice in such a mutually constructed relationship in the eighteenth century. Thus,
moral  discourse  over  legitimacy  continued but  on  different  terms due  to  changing
social and political dynamics in the following centuries.
 
Legitimacy, Honor and Sexual Violence
18 The exercise of power and the maintenance of peace and order for its subjects in itself
was  always  one  of  the  principle  sources  of  legitimacy  for  the  Ottoman  political
authority.17 Yet, one of the legitimizing strategies of early-modern Ottoman state in the
eighteenth century was its claim to protect the honor of its subjects.18 The protection of
honor  was  closely  connected  with  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  in  society,
especially in the provinces where local power brokers were threatening the “honor” of
the state, too. The reconfiguration of power structure as a result of economic and social
restructuring  in  the  late  seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth  centuries  in  favor  of
monetary economy and introduction of a more decentralized system of tax-farming
affected and increased the legal  surveillance by the Ottoman state.  The fragmented
power structure and increasing autonomy of the provincial powers triggered a vigilant
scrutiny of public and social order by the Ottoman state in this period. In this changing
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relationship between the Ottoman central government and its subjects, the petitioning
process must have played an important role in the intermingling of different genres
and in transmission of moral values and legal categories reflecting these values. Just
like the mutual rhetorical usage of “banditry” by the Ottoman state and its subjects,19
so too the notion of honor and the legal term hetk-i ‘ırz (violation of honor) had been
established in this dialogic process.20
19 Why was this “politics of  honor,” most of  the time associated with sexual  honor,  a
legitimizing strategy for the Ottoman state? Scott Taylor explains this in relation to the
notion of justice:
“Honor  creates  the  polite  fiction  of  autonomy  for  those  who  are,  in  truth,
subordinate, and allows both the dominant and subordinate to accept that this state
of  affairs  is  just.  In  this  way, honor  and  sexual  could  be  touchstones  for  the
legitimacy of power. If everyone feels honored, then the hierarchical distribution of
power can seem fair; but if the subjects of empire feel humiliated, the power that
acts on them becomes illegitimate. The subjects then have justification for rebellion
or any other violent act that can reclaim their autonomy and honor” (Taylor 2011:
306-7).
20 This is in fact exactly what rests behind the idea of “circle of justice:” There must be a
“consent” given by a subordinate to the hegemonic power, and the latter should in
return provide a sense of justice by honoring the subjects through protection. In such a
formulation, protecting the honor of its subjects through establishing a moral order
also means protecting the political power’s own legitimacy and honor on the eyes of its
subjects.
21 In this sense, the politics of honor in the early-modern Ottoman polity was a dialogic
process,  as  the  notion  of  honor  was  a  rhetorical  rather  than  structural  code  that
mediated social relations. It was not “structure, provoking a predictable response to
any given predicament,”  but  rather “a resource that both states  and their  subjects
could invoke in crisis, and something that both groups needed to safeguard in order to
sanction their own behavior and status” (ibid.: 309). As we will see in more detail in the
following pages, the legal terms associating sexuality with honor were generally used
in  petitions  in  which  the  early-modern  central  government  and  subjects  were  in
dialogue with each other, albeit in an indirect manner. Petitioners were well aware of
the power of rhetoric. They knew that their petitions must attract the attention of the
Imperial  Council  personnel  to  be  considered  worthy  of  a  hearing  in  the  Imperial
Council.  The crafting of a plausible narrative—albeit within the limits of the official
language—was at  the center  of  the petitioning activity.  However,  as  Natalie  Zemon
Davis brilliantly shows in her study of letters of remission in sixteenth-century France,
looking at  the “fictional”  aspects  of  these documents is  not  inevitably a  “quest  for
fraud”  or  “forgery”  (Davis  1987:  3-4).  Rather,  looking  at  how  the  narratives  were
formulated  through this  collaborative  endeavor  and seeing  what  kind of  rhetorical
strategies were  employed  gives  us  important  clues  about  the  moral  and  social
sensibilities of Ottoman subjects.
22 Let us see a petition submitted to the Imperial Council in Istanbul by a man who was an
inhabitant of Ankara, a provincial city in Central Anatolia,  in 1744. In this petition,
Hasan Beşe, the husband of Fatime, seeks justice against those who committed sexual
assault against his wife:
May you, most excellent and merciful master, be well and strong!
Gendered Subjects in Ottoman Constitutional Agreements, ca. 1740-1860
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 18 | 2014
7
I,  your humble slave,  am an inhabitant of the village of Yıldırım el-viran of the
district of Şorba in Ankara. While my wife Fatime was taking care of her land with
no harm or offense to anyone, Hacıoğlu Kadri, an inhabitant of the same village,
being  one  among  the  harmful  bandits,  “broke  into  my  house”  at  night  and
committed  an  “indecent  act”  (fi‘l-i  şeni‘) with  my  wife  and  “violated  (her/our)
honor”  (hetk-i  ‘ırz)  and  committed  “mischief”  (fesad).  Since  the  aforementioned
Kadri  has run away,  I  kindly request  an imperial  order of  yours addressing the
judges of Ankara and Şorba and the governor of Ankara for resolving the case when
he is captured and establishing justice according to the fetva of the chief mufti that I
present here.
Your humble servant, Karabaşoğlu Hasan Beşe21
23 Although the couple’s experience of the event and their sorrow were of course singular,
the description of case in the petition was not unique at all. There is a host of legal
documents, including petitions, imperial decrees and court records describing other
events in mid-eighteenth-century Anatolia in almost exactly the same way the above
petition describes the sexual assault on Fatime. Certain legal terms like “indecent act”
(fi‘l-i şeni‘) “violation of honor” (hetk-i ‘ırz) or expressions like “breaking into the house”
were  repeated  to  describe  situations  of  sexual  assault.  Furthermore,  those  who
committed sexual assault were generally identified as bandits or brigands with the use
of a certain terminology such as “mütegallibeden” (being considered / from among the
usurpers),  “şaki”  (robber),  and  “eşkıya  taifesinden”  (being  a  member  of  the  gang  of
bandits).
24 My research on sexual offense cases in eighteenth-century Ottoman Imperial Council
registers of Anatolia (Anadolu Ahkam Defterleri)22 and petitions revealed two interesting
phenomena: First, there were many more petitions and imperial decrees concerning
sexual offenses than I  had expected to find since I  was basically assuming that the
central government would not bother itself with the ordinary sexual involvements of
Ottoman subjects. Second, there was an abundance of complaints by Ottoman subjects
against  the  violence  of  certain “bandits”  in  their  local  towns  in  Anatolia.  These
petitions  and  the  imperial  decrees  mention  not  only  generic  types  of  violence
associated  with  banditry,  such  as  plundering  crops,  attacking  houses  and  killing
innocent people, but also, and with almost no exception, incidents concerning their
sexual violence. The juxtaposition of these two issues, that is, the central government’s
surprising interest  in  sexual  crime and petitions  specifically  mentioning the sexual
violence of bandits alongside the other crimes, is crucial for also understanding the
symbolic meaning of other contemporary forms of violence that accompanied sexual
violence.
25 The  case  brilliantly  reveals  the  central  role  of  sexual  violence  as  one  of  the  most
important  indicators  of  the  accused  being  habituated  to  “violence,”  namely  being
bandit. At this point, it is important to consider why sexual violence was one of the
important symbols  of  excessive “violence,”  tantamount to transgressing the gender
order as well as the order and rules of the state. Here, the notion of “honor” and the
question of whose honor was sullied with sexual assault becomes paramount.
26 Islamic literature favors expressions related to privacy, whereas, the definition of the
public sphere in pre-modern Islam starts with the inverse of this private. The terms
such  as  haram/mahzur (forbidden),  sir/maktum (secret),  sitr (veiling),  hurma
(inviolability),  ‘awra (anything that  man conceals  by  reason of  shame or  prudency)
occupy a larger space than antonymic concepts such as ‘alaniyya (open, manifest), or
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tashhir (making well-known, notorious) (Lange, Fierro 2009: 4). So, the public sphere in
pre-modern Islam is defined as the negative of the private, that is, the sphere of life
which is not protected from unwanted intrusions of power. Definitions of privacy in the
Islamic  context  imply  not  only  territorial  and  spatial  privacy  but  also  two  other
inviolabilities: the privacy and dignity of the human body and the inviolability of the
reputation and honor of a person. Violence in this context is the act of unveiling others
and “tearing apart the veil of integrity” (hetk-i ‘ırz).23 Sexuality is in the intersection,
and the very inner core of three components of the definitions of privacy, that is, the
inviolability  of  space,  body  and  honor,  and  thus  an  attack  to  the  sexual  sphere
represents violation of the space, body and honor, all together, in Islamic and early-
modern Ottoman world.
27 In  fact,  one  of  the  most  frequently  encountered  terms  in  eighteenth-century  legal
documents  in  which  the  central  government  and  the  petitioners  used  in  their
correspondences is hetk-i ‘ırz. The term was often coupled with “bandits” and used to
describe certain people’s cruelty and assaults on others’  honor, i.e.,  assaulting their
family, wives and children, slandering them, and in certain cases physically attacking
them, as we have seen in our example. The offenses of breaking into others’ houses and
assaulting  women  and  girls,  and  specifically  committing  sexual  assault  (fi‘l-i  şeni‘)
against a certain woman, girl or boy were generally described by the term hetk-i ‘ırz in
these documents.
28 In our exemplary case, the violation of all three dimensions of privacy is apparent: the
accused violates territorial immunity by “breaking into house,” then violates the right
of  the  inviolability  of  human  body  by  sexually  assaulting  Fatime,  and  as  a  result,
violates the honor of the couple. But most importantly, the honor of Hasan Beşe, the
one responsible for protecting his wife’s body and reputation in a patriarchal society, is
also sullied. All of these acts were defined by the term hetk-i ‘ırz in the petition. Yet, the
violation of the privacy of an Ottoman woman or man was not only a private act of
violence, but also a public one that also violated the honor of the Ottoman state, too. In
other words, the violation of the private was also a violation of the state’s claim to its
monopoly over legitimate violence as the sole authority to interfere and destroy the
privacy of its subjects’ bodies.
29 I argue that this intensive association of honor and sexuality through the usage of the
term hetk-i ‘ırz highlighted in petitions Ottoman subjects sent to the Imperial Council
points to a discursive shift in how morality was negotiated to mediate relations among
Ottoman subjects,  local  and imperial  officials,  as  well  as  the imperial  center in the
eighteenth century. While, by the nineteenth century such a regulation of morals was
accentuated more in governmental thinking and the technologies of the modern state,
as will be discussed in the following section, its roots were based in the relationship of
the  Ottoman  imperial  government  and  its  subjects  in  the  eighteenth  century.  By
claiming that it “protected (the) honor” of its subjects against those who threatened
them, the imperial power attempted to usurp both the existing customary powers such
as that of  community and newly emerging provincial  powers that the central  state
vaguely labeled as “bandits” or “outlaws” in order to gain control over moral order in
society.
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Tanzimat Reforms – “Life, Honor and Property,” and the
Gendered Citizen in the Criminal Code
30 The increasing emphasis both Ottoman subjects and the imperial government placed
on honor  by  manipulating  it  as  a  legal  discourse  in  eighteenth-century  petitioning
enabled the imperial power to categorize and punish sexual offenses more effectively
on  the  principle  of  ta‘zir (discretionary  punishment)  through  the  politico-
administrative jurisdiction of the government. By creating its own terminology such as
“violation of  honor”  (hetk-i  ‘ırz)  and “indecent  act”  (fi‘l-i  şeni‘),  politico-legal  praxis
created a way to avoid the stringent shari‘a rules on zina (fornication and adultery) and
regulate the public order on moral terms on its own discretion.24 This was not in fact
alien to the idea of the “circle of justice” that legitimized the relationship between the
government  and  its  subjects  in  the  classical  Ottoman  politico-legal  theory:  the
sovereign was responsible for the well-being of his subjects by preventing oppression
and injustice in return of the latter’s consent and support (in the form of taxation) for
the government. The “circle” has been preserved by the political and material support
of  the  subjects  to  the  government  who provided  honor  and prosperity  to  them in
return. In this circular notion of justice, honor was the touchstone for the legitimacy of
power.
31 It was the Tanzimat Edict of 1839 that actually codified this new relationship between
the government and the subjects on the basis  of  the protection of  “life,  honor and
property.” Moreover, we frequently come across the terms “violation of honor” (hetk-i
‘ırz) and “indecent act” (fi‘l-i şeni‘) utilized as regular and mainstream terminology in
the nineteenth century. Although the Criminal Code of 1851 (Kanun-ı Cedid) contained
few criminal offenses and used the term hetk-i namus only once (Akgündüz 1986: 825),
fi‘l-i şeni‘ and hetk-i ‘ırz became the usual and most-frequently used terms, replacing zina
and diversifying sexual crimes in the Criminal Code of 1858. The usage of these two
terms in this Code gives us more clues about their meanings in the previous centuries
as well; hetk-i ‘ırz was used as an umbrella heading under which different types of fi‘l-i
şeni‘ offenses such as adultery,  defloration,  rape,  sodomy and molestation were put
together (ibid.: 864-66). The emphasis on honor in conceptualizing sexual offenses and
sexuality  becomes more apparent  when such clustering was  codified.  However,  the
usage  of  the  term  in  the  eighteenth  century  was  no  different;  it  referred  to  the
violation of  one’s  honor through various  assaults  on a  person among which sexual
assault was the most disgraceful.
32 Interestingly enough, the French Penal Code of 1810, from which the Ottoman Criminal
Code  of  1858  was  adopted,  used  the  French  version  of  hetk-i  ‘ırz in  the  heading:  “
Attentats aux mœurs” (Attacks upon morals).25 Moreover, the same terminology seems
to have been used in the Egyptian legal code as early as 1830.26 Yet, it appears that the
idea of “violation of honor” and “attacks upon morality” in Ottoman legal language
precedes the era of legal reform both in the Ottoman Empire and in France.27 Therefore,
just as the old kanunnames were codifications of an amalgam of customary law and
shari‘a,28 the criminal codes of the nineteenth century can be read as a codification and
institutionalization of Ottoman legal custom and terminology which was already in use
during the eighteenth century and even before—albeit influenced in the nineteenth
century by foreign practices, too. Furthermore, the use of a language which was not
directly borrowed from Islamic jurisprudence and the appearance of this terminology
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in nineteenth century codes can also be read as a continuation of a kanun tradition that
created its own language and legal culture,  though not necessarily contradictory to
that of the shari‘a. Concentrating on a well-preserved notion of justice revolved around
the idea of the “circle of justice” instead of creating a binary between the shari‘a and
kanun, or shari‘a and Tanzimat reforms, enable us to understand the prevalence of honor
as one of the most important legitimizing parameters of justice.29
33 The Tanzimat Edict of 1839 which initiated the bureaucratic and institutional reforms of
the following decades was actually established upon the traditional concept of a “just
ruler,” at least in the discursive level (Darling 2008: 23). It legitimized the changes and
reforms  through  the  idea  of  “circle  of  justice,”  by  connecting  justice,  popular
prosperity and the strength of the state:
“Indeed there is nothing more precious in this world than life and honor. What
man, however much his character may be against violence,  can prevent himself
from having recourse to it, and thereby injure the government and the country, if
his life and honor are endangered? If, on the contrary, he enjoys perfect security, it
is  clear  that  he  will  not  depart  from  ways  of  loyalty,  and  all  his  actions  will
contribute to the welfare of the government and of the people.
If there is an absence of security for property, everyone remains indifferent to his
state and his community; no one interests himself in the prosperity of the country,
absorbed as he is in his own troubles and worries. If, on the contrary, the individual
feels complete security about his possessions then he will become preoccupied with
his own affairs, which he will seek to expand, and his devotion and love for his state
and his community will steadily grow and will undoubtedly spur him into becoming
a useful member of society” (Hurewitz 1975: 269-71).
34 The  political  idiom  and  rhetoric  used  in  the  routine  bureaucratic  correspondence
during the Tanzimat period was also established upon “a state ideology of order cum 
prosperity” (Reinkowski 2005: 200). Two images of cyclical order, which are the circle
of justice and the incessant alternation between order and disorder, emerge repeatedly
in  the  vast  material  of  Tanzimat bureaucratic  correspondence  cited  in  Maurus
Reinkowski’s research (ibid.: 200-3). Yet, the new Tanzimat reforms were to be justified
by shifting the ideological stress away from the preservation of the social order toward
the  prosperity  that  would  result  from  good  administration  (Darling  2008:  25).  The
Tanzimat Edict  stated that  the new period would be only the beginning of  “further
beneficial and advantageous measures to make certain the execution of orders insuring
the  well-being  of  the  people,  rich  and  poor,  whose  happy  state  is  a  necessary
precondition for the reinvigoration of religion and state and the prosperity of country
and nation” (İnalcık 1965: 4; rpt in İnalcık, 1978).
35 Since  the  idea  of  “circle  of  justice”  has  promoted  the  politico-administrative
jurisdiction of the government (siyasa) as the judicial enforcer, Tanzimat reforms were
in conformity with this idea not only in the discursive field but also in practice as well.
The intensification and proliferation of state control over finances with an attempt to
abolish tax farming, “exerting control directly over its subjects as individuals rather
than  dealing  with  groups  through  intermediaries”  and  the  “reconsolidation  of
lawmaking and administration in official  hands” (Darling 2008:  27)  by the Tanzimat
reforms can be read as a continuation of the efforts of the central government to exert
control  over  public  order  in  the  eighteenth  century.30 The  strengthening  of
bureaucracy over the ulama or the “triumph of the ‘men of pen’ over magistrates” as
Şerif Mardin (2009: 260) formulated as well as the establishment of new councils and
courts  for  legislative  and  executive  purposes  constitute  the  crystallization  of  the
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appellate system that had already derogated the independent power of the kadı with
the rise of the authority of the governors’ and the imperial councils in the eighteenth
century. Even the transformation of the private and public law “into two increasingly
distinct spheres” (Mardin 2009: 262) was a gradual process that started well before the
Tanzimat and continued well beyond establishment of the Turkish Republic.31
36 Yet, the predisposition of the Ottoman political power towards scrutinizing social order
in the eighteenth century was not then comparable with the endeavors and means of
the  Ottoman  state  during  the  nineteenth  century.  The  eighteenth-century  early
modern power was not only deprived of the “disciplines and technologies of power”
over  a  “deployment  of  sexuality”  but  also  of  the  desire  to  create  “docile  bodies”
through  a  panoptical  surveillance  of  the  subjects  (Foucault  1978  and  1995).  For
example,  in  this  period  punishments  were  not  yet  standardized,  uniformed  or
quantified but  rather  left  to  the “discretion” of  law-enforcers.  A  correlation of  the
length  of  imprisonment  with  the  severity  of  the  crime,  or  the  universalization  of
penalties  in  relation  to  the  crimes,  was  established  only  by  legal  reforms  of  the
nineteenth  century.  Whereas  for  example  regulations  concerning  judicial  and
administrative authorities issued in 1838 still determined the punishment for “bribery”
according  to  status  (of  the  administrator),  just  like  principle  of  discretionary
punishment  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the  penal  codes  of  1840  and  1858  were
constructed  more  in  accordance  with  a  discourse  on  “equality”  and  attempted  to
establish  a  universal  principle  of punishment  based  on  the  crime  committed.32
Furthermore, various councils, both at the imperial center and in the provinces, that
were  established  throughout  the  nineteenth  century  worked  within  a  more
hierarchized  and  institutionalized  appellate  structure,  compared  to  the  loosely
hierarchized appellate triangle of the kadı court, governor’s council and the Imperial
Council in the eighteenth century.33 Within this highly hierarchized judicial system, the
scope of the legal jurisdiction of the local judges and their courts became narrower in
the nineteenth century than in the eighteenth century (Agmon 2006: 68-73 and 235-38).
37 However,  one can still  recognize a path in governmental  mentality which proceeds
from  the  eighteenth  towards  the  nineteenth  century  even  though  it  is  neither  a
trouble-free nor a linear path. One observes continuity especially in the development of
new parameters between the government and its subjects on moral terms through a
mutual claim on honor. Ruth A. Miller accurately defines the Tanzimat period as an
“explicit intent of constructing a modern—understood in the early nineteenth century
as liberal—imperial state.” The 1839 Edict promised “a legally homogeneous Ottoman
citizenry the right to life, honor, and property” (Miller 2005: 355-6). In this sense, the
Tanzimat Edict was a proto-constitution defining the relationship between the state and
its subjects on the basis of “rights and duties” deriving from abstract legal norms such
as honor. In this political schema in which citizenship has been established upon the
abstraction of “equality” and “rights,” Miller argues, rights were granted or acquired
mostly through defining reproduction as one of the most basic attributes of citizenship
and political duty of the citizens. In other words, the modern state puts sexuality and
reproduction  at  the  center  of  citizenship  thanks  to  its  bio-political  concerns  of
“protecting life” from a Foucauldian point of view.34 In this sense, the coupling of “life,
honor  and property”—property  as  a  prerequisite  for  being  a  liberal  citizen—in the
Tanzimat Edict  and emphasis  put on the notion of  “honor” as an umbrella unifying
sexual violence and adultery under one heading in the Tanzimat legal codifications in
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the following decades are not surprising according to this new bio-political model of
rights and citizenship.
38 One observes concrete outcomes of the abstraction of “honor” of the Tanzimat Edict in
the Criminal Code of 1858. In the criminal code, “honor” acquires a gendered character
as opposed to its universal liberal abstraction in the Tanzimat Edict. 35 First of all, it is
sexualized  by  its  association  with  all  sorts  of  sexual  crimes  ranging  from  sexual
molestation to adultery in ten articles under a separate heading of hetk-i ‘ırz (violation
of honor). Secondly, it is gendered through: crime and punishment of sexual assault
and rape were differentiated according to the victim’s gender and age, i.e., they were
all different if the crime was against adult men and women, “virgin girls” and boys.
Similarly,  the  penalties  for  the  procurement  of  “young”  men  and  women  varied.
Finally, the adultery of husbands and wives was also treated differently.36
39 In this construction, women were mostly defined as victims, that is to say, “passive”
subjects whose rights to “honor” should be protected by the state.37 Yet, they were also
envisioned as active subjects, albeit only under one circumstance: as adulterous wives.
The new criminal code—different from its antecedents such as the old criminal code,
the kanunname of Süleyman in the sixteenth century—confined fornication within the
boundaries of the “family” by giving the right of litigation (against the adulterous wife
and her lover) only to the male guardian (e.g., either the husband or the father of the
woman in  the absence of  a  husband).  In  this  sense,  women became active  subject-
citizens through their sexuality only when they were defined as reproductive members
of  the  family,  albeit  from a  negative  angle:  as  the  ones  whose  sexuality  should  be
controlled by the collaboration of the two patriarchs—the state and the patriarch of the
family. In other words, the honor of both the state and the family was to be protected
through  the  regulation  and  control  of  women’s  sexuality.  In  this  constitutional
agreement, the man negotiated his rights with and promised loyalty to the political
sovereign  in  return  for  the  guarantee  of  the  sovereign’s  protecting  his  honor  in
controlling  the  wife’s  sexuality.  The  woman  also  obtained  her  “rights”  of  being
protected from sexual assault, though at the same time, consenting the duplication of
the control over her sexuality through the state’s hands. As part of the negotiation
between patriarchs, the man also promised the father state not to commit adultery
under the sacred roof of the house where he lives with his wife. He was going to be
judged  only  when  his  wife  lodged  a  complaint.  Nevertheless,  the  penalty  for  the
adulterous husband was much lesser than that of the adulterous wife: only the payment
of a fine compares starkly to the adulterous wife’s punishment by imprisonment from
three months to two years.38
40 Hence,  the  boundaries  of  the  “honor”  of  the  individuals  were set  by  the  conjugal
family. If the wife commits adultery no matter how and where, the male guardian was
the  only  one  who  was  authorized  to  “protect”  his  or  her  honor.  If  the  husband
committed adultery, then the state gave authority to the wife but only in case when her
husband’s adultery takes place within the boundaries of the “sacred” house. Otherwise,
the other articles of the 1858 Criminal Code concerning the “violation of honor” are all
related to non-consensual sexual acts:  either rape (cebren fi‘l-i  şeni‘),  molestation, or
female and male trafficking/prostitution. The code apparently lacks any statutes on
consensual illicit sex outside the family bond. This actually signifies an important shift
in the legal surveillance of sexuality; the state replaces the community with the family
in its partnership of regulating sexuality. Whereas the community was responsible for
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monitoring and reporting all sorts of illicit sexuality and “violation of honor” to the
courts, now the “gendered citizen” in the family is responsible for protecting the honor
of him, the family and the state.
 
In Lieu of Conclusion
41 Thinking  about  honor  as  a  tool  that  legitimizes  inequality  through the  rhetoric  of
justice has enabled us to find cohesion in the governmental mentality of the Ottoman
imperial  power  in  its  emphasis  on  the  protection  of  honor  as  the  new  parameter
determining the relationship between the state and its subjects from the eighteenth
century onwards.  While  the  idea  of  justice  disseminating from the sovereign to  its
subjects as a guarantee of prosperity and government was on the one hand present in
the theory of “circle of justice” and siyasa shar‘iyya as well as their application in the
Ottoman legal practice in the early-modern period, on the other hand one should note/
acknowledge that  technologies  of  the modern state  and its  disposition towards the
population  and  family  for  protecting  life  and  honor  starting  from  the  nineteenth
century onwards were novel.
42 This helps us better understand why the Ottomans adopted the French Penal Code of
1810  for  a  more  “modern”  criminal  legislation  of  1858  while  there  was already an
available theoretical and legislative framework for legitimizing state’s intervention on
sexuality  on  the  basis  of  honor.  Rather  than  blindly  adopting  foreign  concepts
wholesale,  it  shows us how the Ottomans inscribed indigenous concepts of  law and
sovereignty into a foreign vocabulary of governance that had all of the trappings of
modernity and progress.  Although the historical  role of  the notion of  honor in the
construction of subjection/subjectivity in French history has not been explored in this
paper,  the  French  code  locating  the  family—with  implicit  reference  to  the  nuclear
family—instead of the community at the center of the definition of the illicit sex was
novel  for  the  Ottomans.  It  apparently  fitted  well  into  the  liberal  attempts  of  the
Ottoman imperial power which aimed to create “Ottoman subjects” on the basis of a
universal-yet-gendered definition of citizenship around the idea of protection of life,
honor and property through the institution of the family. While it remained outside the
scope of this paper, the fundamental question of how such an increasing emphasis on
family and reproduction in the discourse of honor that legitimized more scrutiny and
control over sexuality through codified legislation and disciplinary institutions actually
affected  people’s  daily  experience  of  sexuality  and  gender  dynamics  in  the  society
should be investigated further.
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NOTES
1.  The  modern  constitutions  of  Hungary,  South  Africa,  Switzerland  and  Iran  as  well  as  the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union acknowledge the inviolability of human
dignity.
2.  For a discussion of three different meanings of dignity, namely the dignity of the individual
associated with autonomy and negative freedom; the positive dignity of maintaining a particular
type of life; and the dignity of recognition of individual and group differences that have been
applied in the U.S. constitutional courts, see Rao 2011.
3.  The term “honor” has various forms in Turkish as well as in their Arabic and Persian origins.
While onur and şeref have more neutral meanings of reputation, fame and dignity, namus, ‘iffet, ‘
izzet and  ‘ırz have  more  gender-specific  meanings  of  women’s  chastity  and virtue,  and  male
control of women’s sexuality. In this paper, I try to follow the historical meanings of the terms,
especially of ‘ırz in its usage of the legal term hetk-i ‘ırz (violation of honor).
4.  The preamble of the 1982 constitution as amended on July 23, 1995; Act No. 4121.
5.  Onurlu as being used in the Turkish constitution.
6.  A shorter version of the circle, first quoted in the ʿUyūn al-akhbār (“Fountains information”) of
Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/885) can be explained as follows: ‘There can be no government without men,
no men without money, no money without prosperity, and no prosperity without justice and
good administration’ as being quoted in Darling 2011. The earliest extended version, an aphorism
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attributed to a letter of advice written by Aristotle to Alexander the Great on how to govern his
conquests, appeared in an anonymous Arabic encyclopedic work probably from the fourth/tenth
century, the Sirr al-asrār:  “The world is a garden, hedged about by sovereignty; sovereignty is
lordship, preserved by law; law is policy, governed by the king; the king is a shepherd, supported
by the army; the army are soldiers, fed by money; money is revenue, gathered by the people; the
people are servants, enfolded by justice; justice is harmony, the well-being of the world.” (ibid.).
This longer version had apparently been appropriated by the Ottoman writers in very similar
formulations.
7.  Here I borrow M. Sariyannis’ translation of Bitlisî and his summary of the four cardinal virtues
(ibid.: 124-26).
8.  For detailed analyses of these works, see respectively Tezcan 1996; Hagen 2005; İpşirli 1979-80;
Sariyannis 2011; Ferguson 2010. For analyses of the legitimizing discourses of justice through the
circular view of justice in Ottoman political thinking, see Ergene 2001; Hagen 2005. For a more
general discussion of the concept of “circle of justice” in early Islamic empires and throughout
the Ottoman history, including the reformation period of the nineteenth century, see Darling
2008.
9.  As being translated and quoted in Hagen 2005: 65.
10.  Ibid.; also see Ergene 2001: 56-57.
11.  Al-Mawardi,  a  Shafi‛i  jurist  of  the  eleventh  century  who  discusses  extensively  the
relationship between mazalim and siyasa in his Kitab al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah,  held the military
governor (amir) responsible for the maintenance of public order and security, whereas, he gave
the judge (kadı) the right to adjudicate to protect the rights of individuals in the litigation of
private parties: Al-Mawardi 1996. For biographical information on al-Mawardi, see Brockelmann
2012.  For  a  detailed  description  of  mazalim in  the  early  Islamic  states  and  under  the  Bahri
Mamluks, see Nielsen 1985.
12.  For an extended analysis of this power shift in the Imperial Council as a symbol of larger
transformation in politics and society in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, see Tuğ
2009.
13.  Ferguson also pinpoints the dilemma of the sultan still retaining a “highly visible presence in
Ottoman reform treatises while being in retreat from the daily administration of imperial affairs
as well as from the writers’ conception of justice.” (Ferguson 2010: 97)
14.  In fact, Ayn’Ali Efendi’s Risale had been ordered by the Grand Vizier Murad Pasha. It was
modified by Ayn’ Ali Efendi by putting in amendments about the salaries of state officials of the
time and resubmitted to the grand-vizier in 1018 (Ayn’ Ali Efendi 1863: 83-87).
15.  For detailed information about this work, see Babinger 1992; Barkan 1943.
16.  For a detailed analysis of these private lawbooks in their relationship with the entire kanun
practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Tuğ 2009: 66-8 and 91-3. Ferguson 2010
makes an intelligent analysis of how Ottoman authors of this period deployed archival sources of
the past to create a reform agenda in a way different from the advice literature of the previous
generation. See especially ibid.: 109-16.
17.  For  a  detailed  and analytical  discussion of  the  legitimizing mechanisms of  the  Ottoman
sultanate,  both  the  normative  and  factual  ones,  see  Karateke  2005.  He  considers  the
establishment of “justice and order” through preventing arbitrary legal processes via courts and
institutionalized  mechanisms  of  personal  redress  as  well  as  the  huge  corpus  of  legislation
procedures as one of the most important pillars of “factual” legitimacy.
18.  The research in this section is primarily based on my Ph.D. dissertation (Tuğ 2009).
19.  For  detailed  historical  examples  of  the  rhetorical  usage  of  banditry  in  the  eighteenth-
century legal  documents,  see ibid.: 154-68.  Similarly,  Tolga Esmer’s  contribution to this  issue
documents well the repertoire of narrative strategies and tropes of the Ottoman officials as well
as of the irregular soldiers/bandits in Rumeli during this same period.
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20.  By saying this, I do not mean that the notion of honor has been only used or discovered in
the  legal  culture  of  the  eighteenth  century.  To  see  how  honor  and  reputation  acquired  an
important moral function in relation to sexual and moral order of the Ottoman society before
and after the eighteenth century, see Leslie Peirce contribution to this issue in addition to Peirce
2003; Peirce 1997; Semerdjian 2008; Tucker 1998; Baer 2011. Yet, the term hetk-i ‘ırz (violation of
honor) has rarely been used in legal records before the eighteenth century. As I will explain in
this  section,  the  novel  utilization  of  this  term  in  the  correspondence  between  the  central
government and the Ottoman subjects in the eighteenth century points to a construction of a
constitutional relationship based on morals. In this sense, this period represents a shift towards a
notion  of  honor  as  “constitutional  contract”  from  “social  contract”  defined  in  Peirce’s
contribution to this special edition.
21.  Prime Ministry Archive, A.DVN.ŞKT, folder 67, petition 134 (1157/1744).
22.  I  have  specifically  researched  Anatolian  Registers  of  Imperial  Rescripts  (Anadolu  Ahkam
Defterleri), i.e., the imperial petitionary registers of Anatolia written by the Imperial Council in
response to the petitions and letters coming from the Anatolian province. It is important here to
note  that  the  central  government  started  keeping  records  of  imperial  rescripts  written  in
response  to  petitions  coming  from  ordinary  Ottoman  subjects  and  low-level  administrators
throughout the empire only in the second half of the seventeenth century. These records form a
special series called Petition Registers (Şikayet Defterleri). More importantly, from 1742 onward,
separate registers of such rescripts known as Provincial Registers of Imperial Rescripts (Vilayet
Ahkam  Defterleri)  were  set  up  for  the  most  important  provinces  such  as  Anadolu,  Rumeli,
Erzurum, Şam, etc. The series of Anatolian Registers of Imperial Rescripts in the Prime Ministry
Ottoman Archives in Istanbul contains 186 volumes for the period from 1742 to 1889. I examined
two volumes  of  these  registers  covering  the  period  between 1742  and 1744;  the  first  one  is
composed of 284 pages containing 1254 imperial rescripts and the second of 292 pages containing
1248 rescripts.
23.  The expression literally means “tearing (one’s) honor” and “disgracing someone.” See Wehr,
Cowan 1980: 1018. Interestingly enough, hetk itself acquires a meaning in Arabic which implicitly
accommodates “honor,” despite the fact that ‘ırz normally means honor.  Moreover,  the term
hatīka which stems from the same root means “dishonor.” See Farès 2012.
24.  For a discussion of the all-encompassing and ambiguous term zina in shari‛a with regard to its
blindness to the question of consent (i.e., hardly differentiating rape and fornication in theory)
and the stringent rules of conviction of the crime of zina in Islamic law, see Imber 1996; Sonbol
1997; Peirce 2008; Ze’evi 2006: 48-76.  For a detailed analysis of different terminology used to
replace  zina and  the  use  of  “discretionary  punishment”  to  penalize  sexual  crimes  more
effectively and “centrally” in the eighteenth-century legal practice, see Tuğ 2009: 173-311.
25.  “Attentats aux mœurs” in livre III, titre II, section IV in Code pénal de 1810 (Texte intégral - État
lors  de  sa  promulgation  en  1810),  URL:  http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/la_legislation_criminelle/
anciens_textes/code_penal_de_1810.htm (accessed July 1, 2014). For its English version, see The
Penal Code of France 1819.
26.  Illegal defloration (izalat bakarat bint) was considered among the offenses against a person’s
honor (hatk ‘ird). See Kozma 2001: 2; Peters 1997: 81-82.
27.  Despite the fact that it is beyond the limits of this paper, it would be interesting to explore
whether there were any interaction between the early-modern legal cultures of the Ottomans
and French which would have created such a common terminology as reflected in their codified
penal codes of the nineteenth century.
28.  For a detailed analysis of kanun in the early-modern Ottoman world, see Tuğ 2009: 40-96.
29.  For  recent  approaches  challenging  the  binary  between shari‛a and  kanun,  see  Tuğ  2009;
Ferguson 2010; Stilt 2011.
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30.  For a similar analysis which construes the Ottoman legal system in the eighteenth century as
the  building  stone  of  the  “modern  penal  system”  established  through  penal  reforms  of  the
nineteenth century, see Zarinebaf 2010: 175-81.
31.  Fahmy (forthcoming) makes a brilliant analysis of the simultaneous and blurred use of both
kanun and shari‛a in these reformed courts and councils in Mehmed Ali’s Egypt.
32.  Cengiz Kırlı’s 2006 study on the “invention” of corruption in the penal code of 1840 vividly
demonstrates  how  a  new  legal  discourse  on  “equality”  was  constructed  on  universalizing
punishment  based  on  the  crime.  Yet,  crimes  against  honor  and  slander  were  still  punished
according to the old principle of discretionary punishment in criminal laws of both 1840 and
1851.  In  other  words,  the  punishments  of  the  state  officials  and  ulama were  determined
differently according to their status by the superior councils (Meclis-i Ahkam-ı Adliye for 1840 and
Meclis-i Vala for 1851). For the full text of the penal codes of 1840 and 1858, see Akgündüz 1986:
808-76. Miller (2005: 52-55) sees a pattern of intensification of a shift from the concept of victim
losing  “any  importance  it  may  once  have  had”  to a  situation  where  the  “life”  of  the  state
overrides “the ‘life’ of the inherently deviant individual” from 1840 to 1858. In other words, she
highlights the intensification of the emphasis made to the political crimes and crimes against the
state  over  ordinary  crimes  against  people  and  property.  Although  I  do  not  agree  with  her
emphasis on the rupture from the previous period, I agree that the state’s legal attention was on
political crimes and bureaucratic legal centralization. It is my contention that the universalizing
punishments based on the crime worked parallel to this bureaucratic centralization and state’s
anxieties about political crimes.
33.  For these various councils established throughout the nineteenth century, see Bingöl 2004;
Ekinci 2004; Çadırcı 1985; Rubin 2011.
34.  For  a  recent  study  that  analyzes  Ottoman  reproduction  policies  such  as  the
professionalization of midwives, a ban on abortion and greater medical care during pregnancy as
part of a plan of population growth in the late nineteenth century, see Balsoy 2013.
35.  In fact, the criminal law of 1858 was much more detailed in defining crimes and punishments
compared to 1840 and 1851 laws. It was partly because it adopted a much more detailed 1810
Napoleonic criminal code and, most importantly, because it was twenty years later than the first
Ottoman criminal code (1838) in the nineteenth century.
36.  See Miller 2005: 366-8 for a detailed analysis of the articles concerning adultery in both the
Ottoman and French Code.
37.  Miller (2005: 363 n.15) defines this citizenship right as “negative” right, that is, the right not
to be coerced.
38.  Supplement to Article 201. See Akgündüz 1986: 865-66.
ABSTRACTS
This article aims to historicize the notion of honor in the Ottoman legal discourse and practice
from the early-modern period to the so-called “reform era”,  the era most scholars  maintain
began  with  the  Tanzimat  Edict  of  1839.  Such  a  historical  approach  uses  justice  as  a  key  to
understand honor not as a value system, but as a rhetoric. Thus, it problematizes an a-historical
conception of honor which assumes that honor codes in modern societies are largely the legacy
of “traditional” norms of the pre-modern periods. This study argues that the persistent emphasis
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on honor in the correspondence especially between the central government and the Ottoman
subjects in the eighteenth century reflects the development of new parameters between the state
and its subjects in moral terms. On the one hand, the motto of “life, honor and property” of the
Tanzimat Edict represents a continuation of such discourse of honor as a legitimizing mechanism.
Yet, on the other hand, the legal codification of honor in the Criminal Codes of the nineteenth
century reflects a novel constitutional construction of gendered citizenship around reproduction
in the conjugal family through the partnership of the patriarchal state and the male subjects.
INDEX
Keywords: honor, sexual violence, gender, violation of honor, justice, legitimacy, circle of
justice, public order, Ottoman Empire, eighteenth century, Tanzimat, criminal law, criminal code
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